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This has continued in US foreign policy with a stress upon the justice of war (O'Driscoll 2008) , but the change has equally been marked in British (Little and Wickham-Jones 2000) and EU foreign policy (Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Bulley 2009 ). Perhaps ethics now seem 'more affordable' after the Cold War (Gelb and Rosenthal 2003, 5) , but given that the results have been hugely unpopular wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and an apparent inability to deal with Darfur (Bellamy and Williams 2006) and Syria, the full 'digestion of its meaning' is more important than ever.
In spite of this, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), as the sub-discipline of International Relations (IR) that theorizes foreign policy explicitly, has singularly failed to even attempt such a digestion. IR has explored ethical theories and issues in greater depth, despite some 'false-starts' (Frost 1998, 124-129) . From the early works of Charles R. Beitz (1979) , through that of Chris Brown (1992) and Kimberly Hutchings (1999) , IR has sought to draw out and define traditions and approaches to how international actors ought to behave. 2 In recent years, a burgeoning array of IR literature has taken us beyond familiar dichotomies (such as cosmopolitanism and communitarianism; deontology and consequentialism) into virtue ethics (Gaskarth 2012) , pragmatism (Cochran 1999; Brassett 2009 ), feminism (Hutchings 2007) , just war theory Wheeler 2002) , the natural law tradition (Boucher 2009; Cavallar 2002 ) and continental philosophy (Campbell 1998a; Der Derian 1997) . IR has borrowed widely from a range of disciplines to define different conceptions of ought, whether that be in terms of ethical rules of conduct, the type of life to live, or the way we relate to and encounter others (Brown 2001, 20-21 ). Yet, seemingly ignoring the interdisciplinarity counted as one of its hallmarks (Hudson 2005, 2) , FPA has had comparatively little to say on the topic.
In this article I ask why this is the case, and how ethics can be theorized more effectively in the realm of foreign policy by making the case for a critical approach. By a 'critical approach' I mean one which goes beyond describing the system of moral principles and ethical norms involved in foreign policies; one which also 'focuses on the grounds of that system's possibility' (Johnson 1981, xv) , looking at the exercises of power that produced those ethics and how they can be, and are, politically contested. Ultimately, it seeks a re-evaluation of the values contained in foreign policy, asking how we might make them 'better'. This 'better'
does not necessarily mean emancipation, as Critical Theorists would argue (Cox 1981) ; it seeks transformation but without a settled idea of what emancipation could mean. Like many of the critical approaches to ethics emerging from IR scholarship, I suggest that this 'better' cannot be ultimately grounded or finally established, but must be a matter of continual contestation and debate -ethics is political. As Brown argues, ethical principles often clash with each other and this requires a 'political argument that engages the issues directly' (Brown 2001, 26) .
The article proceeds in three sections. Firstly, I ask how and why constructivist approaches, which are highly attuned to the intersubjective sphere of ideas and meanings of which ethics are necessarily a part, has generally avoided dealing with morality. Secondly, I examine the possibilities and limits of one piece of constructivist theorizing that effectively explores the apparent translation of morality into foreign policy via 'norms'. This demonstrates the problems that a constructivist account, unsupplemented by a more critical approach, will face when exploring the role of ethics. Finally, I argue that to effectively engage the issue we need to reconceptualise foreign policy as ethics. This provides a way into the problem of how we can 'better' relate ethically to the foreign, rather than just noting that we already do in certain respects. Through an examination of EU foreign policy (from 1999-2004) , and its innovative use of 'hospitality', I suggest that FPA must reassess the value of the norms and principles by which foreign policy operates in order to suggest potentially more ethical modes of encounter.
TRAINING TO IGNORE? MARGINALISING ETHICS IN FPA
Theorizations of foreign policy have diversified a great deal in the last twenty years (Hudson 2005) . While parts of the field (such as Sprout and Sprout 1965; Carlsnaes 1986 ) have always taken the ideational realm into account, Ole Waever (1990, 336) has noted that the field of FPA should extend its theorizations to other ideational factors relevant to foreign policy, those 'not in the individuals but in between them in a specific discourse space -the political sphere'. Those who really took up this challenge and ran with it were constructivists who argued that foreign policy is not simply made from individuals' beliefs and their interaction with the 'real world' of foreign policy. Rather, individuals helped form that world through their shared understandings of, and ideas about, it (Kubalkova 2001) . The foreign policy world, like any other, is 'not entirely determined by physical reality', but is 'socially emergent' (Onuf 1998, 59) . Thus the meaning is created, it does not just depend upon an external reality but also an intersubjective social reality made possible by social communication (Adler 1997, 326) . Such meaning was to be found in 'specific discursive fields -and not just in bilateral subject-object relationships' (Waever 1990, 336 ).
This engagement with how foreign policy was made, at least in part, from intersubjectively created and shared ideas and meanings was a crucial breakthrough. Traditional FPA had failed to engage with the way that its theorizations of foreign policy had also been interpreting and perpetuating certain assumptions about foreign policy and the way it operated in world politics. As Roxanne Lynn Doty (1993, 298) noted, traditional FPA was engaged with asking why particular foreign policies were undertaken; in doing so, it presupposed a certain view of subjectivity and 'a background of social discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves'. The fact that certain foreign policies could be undertaken therefore went unquestioned, and the ethical issues those policies raised were ignored.
A classic example is Graham Allison's seminal work, Essence of Decision (revised edition, 1999). Here, Allison sets himself the task of explaining three major policy decisions which produced the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: the Soviet decision to send missiles to Cuba; the US decision to blockade Cuba; and the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba.
He explains why these decisions were taken via three 'models'. However, throughout his analysis the ethics of these decisions go unquestioned. But if, instead of asking such 'why' questions, we ask Doty's 'how-possible' questions (such as, how did it become possible for the US to decide to blockade Cuba?) important assumptions about the world are revealed (Doty 1993, 297-298 Before I go on in the next section to discuss the treatment of norms in one particular case, I
think it is important to ask why, and indeed how, constructivism has tended to perpetuate the marginalisation of ethical discussion from FPA. It must be noted that to generalise in this regard can only be for heuristic purposes, in order to try to get a handle on the issue.
Generalizations about constructivism will never be accurate as there are as many different forms of the approach as there are constructivists (see Zehfuss 2002 ). Yet, perhaps we can say that the two main reasons have been, firstly, the character and aims of dominant modes of the approach to international politics and foreign policy; and secondly, the desire of many theorists to separate their work from that of poststructuralists.
Firstly, as Kubalkova (2001, 71) notes, constructivism does not try to provide a theory of foreign policy, and certainly does not try to offer a political theory of the international. It is neither 'problem-solving' nor 'critical' in Robert Cox's (1981) terms, and it is certainly not critical in the sense I outlined in the introduction. Instead, it is a general frame for understanding the social production of meaning. Thus, theorists such as Kublkova and Onuf stress the method of splitting our intersubjective social reality into different categories, such as rules, practices, institutions and so on (Onuf 1998) . This is done so that social reality can be 'more fruitfully analysed' (Kubalkova 2001, 66) . But what does 'more fruitfully analysed'
mean? For what purpose? Karin Fierke (2001, 129) puts it succinctly when she observes that the goal of constructivism in IR must be 'constructing a better account of the past'. As such, constructivism can, and does, engage both traditional 'why' questions and 'how' questions. A 'better account' must tell us both why certain policies occurred and, at least to a certain degree, how they became possible in Doty's terms. But any further aim than this cannot come from constructivism itself as it does not necessarily embrace a critical agenda, or any form of ethical and political change. These, if they are to be endorsed, must come from elsewhere.
We can see this aim operating in Fierke's exploration of the Cold War's demise. She examines the irony of its end in that neither side's foreign policy aimed to achieve it; indeed, neither side wanted it, and yet the Western 'we've won' explanation nevertheless became dominant (Fierke 2001, 128) . She suggests that poststructuralists, such as David Campbell, would merely explain this by pointing out that the 'powerful have once again succeeded in marginalizing and silencing voices ' (2001, 128) . While this is in itself a 'powerful argument', she suggests it has two limits: firstly, 'it suggests the game is over', the dominant voice won.
Secondly,
There is little critical about this account except to demonstrate that we are all writings of the propaganda apparatus of the powerful. It does not tell us how the marginalized would be given more space to speak. More importantly, it does not give us any criteria for coming up with a better account of what happened. The argument is that multiple stories can always be told, although the story of the dominant tends to prevail. By contrast, we want to think about the criteria for constructing a better account of the past. (Fierke 2001, 128-129) .
It is crucial to understanding the meaning of the end of the Cold war and how this argument is of little use as it is an 'interpretation imposed after the fact'. In contrast, her constructivist 'conflicting games' argument is 'better' because it 'embeds the moves of any one actor in a larger intersubjective space and traces, over time, the transition from one game to another ' (2001, 133) . Constructivists therefore seek to categorise and trace changes in intersubjective meaning because it gives them a better grasp of this slippery social reality. This is 'more important' than telling us how marginalized figures could be given more space to speak.
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But if we judge an explanation of foreign policy based on its embeddedness in intersubjective space, is Fierke's account so clearly better? Presumably a Western 'we won' account could be so embedded. How then could we judge? A quantification of 'embeddedness' would surely show us little, if it were even possible. Therefore, simply because the 'we won' account's current formulation is poorly situated does not prevent it being potentially 'better'. Campbell (1993, 7-8) argues, in contrast to Fierke, that we should look to interpretation 'that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating, and specifying "real causes", concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another'. For Fierke, this leaves poststructuralists such as Campbell with no way of judging which account of the past is better, but in fact Campbell is explicit on this point: he suggests 'moral grounds ' (1998a, 43 ).
Narratives should be tested from case to case without universal criteria 'in terms of the relationship with the other they embody'. In this sense, narratives which glorify genocide can be judged 'worse' because they seek to destroy the identity of the other. On this criteria then, we can perhaps see Fierke's account of the Cold War's demise as 'better' than the 'we won' thesis because the latter implies the superiority of the self and is a way of degrading and belittling the other, with clear political and ethical consequences. It is not 'better' because its greater openness will generate better policy prescriptions (a liberal pluralist position), but because it is more ontologically responsible to the other, acknowledging a duty to and for the other born of its constitutive relation to the self (see Campbell 1998a; Bulley 2009).
So Campbell suggests a way of discerning better accounts of foreign policy while also engaging issues of ethics. Perhaps, however, it is the explicit desire of many constructivists to separate their work from that of poststructuralists like Campbell that has contributed to its perpetuating the marginalisation of ethics from analyses of foreign policy. Stefano Guzzini (2000, 148) , for example, stresses the need to resist 'succumb[ing] to the sirens of postsructuralism', which 'is increasingly emptied of intelligible meaning'. The primary aim of providing better accounts of the past is also about trying to demonstrate that constructivism is 'compatible with good social science' (Adler 1997, 322) , and justifying itself to the mainstream of the discipline. This then prompts the likes of Ben Tonra's polemical mischaracterisation of the middle ground it tries to stake out.
This constructivist turn does not go as far as post-structuralist approaches: those far countries of post-modernism where language is everything and there are no material constructs, only discourse. It does, however, offer a challenge to exclusively instrumental rationalist accounts. (Tonra 2003, 738) While I do not dispute that a useful middle-ground has been carved out by constructivism, especially in the study of foreign policy, it is unfortunate that this has often been pursued by continuing the traditional marginalisation of ethics from FPA.
MORAL PRINCIPLES AND ETHICAL NORMS
It would be wrong to suggest that those who take a constructivist approach to foreign policy do not examine ethics. Xavier Guillaume (2002) offered some very useful insights based on a Bakhtinian dialogical model. Yet, much more common is for constructivists to speak of 'values' in foreign policy, and especially 'norms'. These terms have most commonly been used in recent years in relation to EU foreign policy, which is seen to be, and exercise, a peculiarly 'normative power' (Manners 2002 ; see also Lucarelli and Manners 2006) . This, Ian Manners (2002, 252) clarifies, means that not only does the EU shape what is 'normal' in international politics, but 'that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international system'. 4 This sounds very much like the operation of ethics, which we are alerted to by an 'ought' statement (Singer 1994 ). Yet, Manners is not clear on the relation between ethics and norms. He has argued more recently that normative 'does not mean the same as "ethical" but is part of being honest about why and how foreign policy is conducted' (Manners 2007, 118) . In other words, the normative is less about ethics and more about, like Fierke, giving a 'better account' of foreign policy which, after all, is thoroughly normative. Yet, he also claims that it is about how things should he, about judging and directing human conduct (Manners 2007, 117-118) , which, again, sounds a lot like ethics. The relation is ultimately left hanging.
Perhaps norms and the normative are felt to be in some sense 'safer', less risky, than talking about ethics and the ethical. Nonetheless, an excellent effort has been made to engage precisely this issue in the sometimes overlooked The Ethics of Destruction, by Ward Thomas (2001) . Because of Thomas's ability to combine constructivist analysis with ethics, norms and foreign policy, he will be the focus of this section of the paper. While his work cannot be equated with the constructivist take on these issues (as noted above, there are as many constructivisms as there are constructivists), his is the only extended, book-length constructivist discussion of them, and helpfully highlights both the possibilities and limits of a constructivist analysis. Thomas also displays far more adeptness at linking and separating norms from ethics and morality than the likes of Manners. He makes a fundamental distinction between 'moral principles' and 'ethical norms'. A moral principle, he argues, is 'a proposition or tenet that expresses an abstract judgement about right and wrong' and is therefore necessarily very general. Ethical norms are 'less abstract corollaries, closer to the realm of action' (Thomas 2001, 27) .
Such ethical norms are ethical to the extent that they are 'at least implicitly based upon or referring to a moral principle of one description or another' (Thomas 2001, 28) . This is what separates ethical norms from the merely instrumental (those, for example, that maintain trade relations) or ritualistic (such as many diplomatic norms). In contrast, ethical norms are concerned with right and wrong, with judgement and prescription, because of the link they maintain to their moral principle. We can tell that they are specifically ethical norms because without this link it is difficult to account for their existence (Thomas 2001, 28) . However, the separation between moral principles and ethical norms is fundamental for Thomas.
While a moral principle can be held by one person, norms are necessarily intersubjective and require broader agreement. And while moral principles only suggest action by their abstract implication, ethical norms precisely and explicitly guide behaviour in the concrete realm of action.
This means that, while abstract moral principles are divested of power and politics by Thomas, norms are subject to interests and the calculations of states. This is what explains the often stark differences between the two:
For any principle to be operationalized as a norm it must move from the abstract realm of morality to the concrete realm of political action. In so doing it becomes subject to the calculations of states that, as realism reminds us, pursue their interests in a competitive environment. In the process the underlying moral imperative is often distorted or diluted. Moreover, because they are collective understandings and not abstract principles (that is, intersubjective rather than subjective phenomena), ethical norms derive their strength from the degree of consensus they enjoy and the level of commitment they engender. It is therefore impossible to discuss ethical norms without at least implicit reference to a power structure that constructs and maintains them. (Thomas 2001, 30) What Thomas is doing here is to separate morality from politics, and argue that norms are a kind of political ethics, though he does not use those terms. Thus ethics is subsumed into the very structure of international society by Thomas, as he argues that they both produce and are produced by state's interests. There is a constant loop feeding back between the two -between morality and politics -and this loop is the place of the ethical norm. This allows him to dismiss the neorealist critique that anarchy banishes ethics from foreign policy, because norms are in fact a constitutive part of the structure of anarchy. Thomas (2001, 33-34) argues that there are two types of ethical norm: power-maintenance norms and convention-dependent norms. The former are those which basically support the existing power structure of international society (such as, he will go on to argue, the norm outlawing the assassination of foreign leaders) (Thomas 2001, 84) . This gives powerful states a reason to respect the norm even if it does not appear to be in their immediate interests.
However, because they are part of the structure of international society, no state can simply create a norm from nowhere; convention-dependent norms, which are based on reciprocity and precedent, thus partially evade their grasp. But because they are not based on powerful state's interests, once reciprocity or precedent are partially broken, they are much more easily set aside (as he goes on to demonstrate with aerial bombing in World War II) (Thomas 2001, 146) . But even such convention-dependent norms inform a state's interests and are not easily abandoned. As he points out, violation of such norms damages international legitimacy and therefore the effectiveness of a state's power in international institutions -thus, damage to the moral status of a state 'creates a considerable structural disincentive to norm violation that must be weighed against the immediate advantage gained' (Thomas 2001, 36) .
The undeniable strength of Thomas' argument is the manner in which he clearly sets out the way ethics are translated into the foreign policy behaviour of states, not just as a choice, but as a structural constraint and incentive to particular actions. And he does this in the very backyard of neorealism -the use of force. States generally comply with norms against certain uses of force because such norms 'define what and who they are, what they want and how they view international politics' (Thomas 2001, 17) . Without such norms, power-maintaining though many are -there could be no explanation for the restraint shown by states in their use of force. And we could not understand these norms without two key elements: the moral principles upon which they are based; and the 'political processes', the 'considerations of power and interest, which often distort -but do not obliterate -moral principles' (Thomas 2001, 3 ).
Yet, there is still something missing to such an analysis of ethics and foreign policy.
Thomas's project is the same as Fierke's -that of providing a 'better account' of the past. Frost (1998, 131) has noticed a similar concentration only on 'positive explanation' in Constructivist IR, which has generated a 'thoroughgoing descriptivism'. The problem is that, having pointed out the operation of norms there is no subsequent move to evaluate those norms (Frost 1998, 125 ). Thomas's focus on norms is born of no desire for more ethical or responsible foreign policies, however ethics/responsibility is conceived, but merely because '[u]nderstanding norms... allows us to understand aspects of international politics that would otherwise remain anomalous' (Thomas 2001, 195) . There is no point of critique here, there is no attempt to transform the role of ethics and morality in norms, or the role of norms in foreign policy. Rather, Thomas' interest appears almost entirely instrumental -if we didn't look at norms, our account of certain policies would be insufficient or incomplete.
Thomas is highly attuned to the way power operates through norms and the way norms effectively exercise a form of power. But he is content to describe the operations of this power, rather than to suggest how it could be changed, or how power could be exercised otherwise. He notes that norms often ill-reflect the moral principles which help produce them and puts this down to operations of power and competition in the international system. Yet he seems unconcerned by this. No suggestion is made that this situation is unsatisfactory, or that anything could be done to improve the norm's reflection of morality.
No mode is offered by which the value of these norms can be judged. They simply are. Thus, he is content to argue that we cannot expect moral altruism from states, that ethics is not an 'all-or-nothing proposition', and that, by implication, we should be content with this situation (Thomas 2001, 192) . Of course, Thomas has set up a straw man here; I am aware of no scholar who would suggest that foreign policies can, or ought, to operate altruistically (see Brown 2001, 21) . But by suggesting this as a key criticism of his argument, he swerves more wide-spread critical takes on the possibilities for international ethical action (for one excellent collection, see Campbell and Shapiro 1999 
FOREIGN POLICY AS ETHICS
If our contemporary theorizations of foreign policy are to deal effectively with issues of ethics, I am not convinced that an uncritical acceptance of norms is sufficient to the task.
More is needed which can give us access to the way ethics necessarily impinges on all elements of foreign policy. Foreign policy makers do not face a choice 'whether or not to be ethical. We are ethically constrained in everything we do' (Frost 2001, 35 ). But we also need a way to consider the value of these ethical constraints. As Nietzsche (2000, 456) (Campbell 1998b, 68-69) . The broader practice of 'foreign policy' refers to discursive 'practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their object as "foreign" in the process of dealing with them' (Campbell 1998b, 68-69) . This is foreign policy seen as a universal way of constituting 'domestic' and 'foreign'
-of separating and excluding the 'foreign' from the 'domestic', the outside from the inside and the other from the self. Foreign Policy, meanwhile, is how IR and FPA generally conceive foreign policy: as a state-based practice directed toward that which is beyond the state's borders, that which is 'foreign' and not 'domestic'. The capitalised Foreign Policy is, therefore, a specific instance of the 'foreign policy' that we all perform each moment, both individually and collectively (see Bulley 2009 ).
This rethinking of foreign policy means that not only does it have a necessary ethical dimension, but the two are in fact concerned with the same matter. Both ethics and foreign policy are about how we constitute and relate to otherness, the foreign, even if that otherness appears as part of the 'self'. If we have ethical responsibilities for our 'selves' -individually or collectively -it is because we are acknowledging a divide within those selves:
that which owes and that which receives the response. We are acknowledging the otherness within, that we are all more or less 'strangers to ourselves' (Kristeva 1994; Dillon 1999) , our families and communities. Thus, any attempt to fully and finally separate the fields of ethics and foreign policy, or to 'join' them through the use of norms, is ultimately futile because both deal with precisely the same issue. The 'stuff' of ethics is foreign policy: it is about the way we ought to relate to otherness. And if foreign policy is a practice of constructing otherness and relating to it, the question of foreign policy must be how we ought to do this.
Foreign policy is best viewed as ethics. Even when questions of 'ought' are not explicit in the practice of foreign policy, assumptions are made that presuppose a particular production of and relation to otherness, a specific 'self' and 'other', and the way they ought to relate.
A re-evaluation of the values that both produce and are produced in the moment of encounter that is foreign policy takes us beyond the 'better accounting' of constructivism. It demands that we pay great attention to the language of foreign policy to examine how the relationship to the foreign, the ethical relation, is being constructed and understood. This reveals unexpected results. It also requires that we explore how the norms and values which emerge empower and disempower the self and other, and whether 'better' forms of relation might be envisaged. This 'better' will necessarily always retain its 'scare quotes' as, having removed the transcendental metaphysics of ethics, having acknowledged what Andrew Linklater (1998, 48) calls the impossibility of 'occupying an Archimedean standpoint which permits objective knowledge of permanent moral truths', we place morality squarely in the realm of the political. As such, the relation must be kept open to contestation, re-evaluation and critique. Nonetheless, it allows the possibility of a more ethical encounter with the foreign than is perhaps currently possible under existing norms and values that are often taken for granted.
Various examples of such re-evaluations can be seen in contemporary critical explorations of international ethical concepts, throughout different disciplines. For instance, in critical legal scholarship, Costas Douzinas (2007) has examined the link between an ethics of human rights policies and the violence of liberal cosmopolitanism, while Anne Orford (1999; has critiqued the narratives of heroism that appear throughout Western states' humanitarian interventions. In International Political Economy James Brassett (2010) However, what marks the EU out as singular with regard to its conception of international ethics is how that 'responsibility' was to be exercised. Rather than through humanitarian intervention or foreign aid, which was how British foreign policy during this period inviting them into our home?' (Patten 2005, 117) .
Hospitality, while not a concept much explored in international politics or foreign policy (Bulley 2006) , is a mode of ethical relation with a long and venerable tradition (Bolchazy 1977; Cavallar 2002; Brown 2010) . At its most basic, hospitality can perhaps be defined as an openness toward strangers, a welcoming of the foreign into the home, the domestic. As such, it is a clear example of foreign policy as ethics -hospitality is a way of producing and relating a self and an other. Moreover, this relation is commonly expressed as a good and thus as an ought, especially by the EU. However, significant problems arise with any definition of hospitality due to its aporetic, or inherently contradictory structure, and we can read this problem through its use in EU foreign policy. Firstly, even the most hospitable and open policy during this period, that of enlargement, was never an unconditional offer of The EU's enlargement and its policy toward the Balkans make no attempt to achieve this. In order to receive a positive opinion from the Commission on its application to join the EU, the first step of the process, a country must be a There is also a third problem with regard to hospitality as a mode of ethical praxis in EU foreign policy. While the EU's hospitality may be seen as too conditional, even if an unconditional openness to the foreign were possible that openness would risk destroying the very home which enables hospitality in the first place. Hospitality relies and depends upon a bounded space into which a subject can welcome the stranger, that which does not 'belong'.
But welcoming the foreign into the domestic makes it no longer, in a pure sense, the domestic any longer. It is no longer just 'my' home, but the home of the other as well. And should all strangers be allowed in, the home would no longer be a bounded space which anyone can call their 'own'. Thus, Prodi (2002c) It proffers a mode of critique, a way of assessing current values and practices for the relation they produce to the foreign. Thus we can examine current EU practices toward the Balkan countries or toward Turkey and question the way these subjects are being produced as 'foreign' and the conditions that are being placed upon their accession. But we are also offered the possibility of transforming these relations through this critique. While such a transformation would have to be hedged, as allowing countries into the EU will always be a risk, the possibility of moving toward a more ethical relation, perhaps, remains.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper has been to suggest that theorizations of foreign policy need to engage the tricky issue of ethics. The guiding principle of such endeavour is not, however, like Gelb and Rosenthal, that of reaching a 'values consensus'. After all, on many issues as Thomas demonstrates, Western foreign policies have already inadvertently reached such a consensus.
Instead, I have stressed the importance of three key moves. Firstly, I argue that we need to theorize ethics as a constituent part of foreign policy, to examine foreign policy as always expressing an ethics in the way that it produces a 'self' and an 'other', a 'domestic' and a 'foreign', and the way they ought to relate. Secondly, I argued that, in doing this, there is a need to go further than simply accounting for the role that ethics currently play in foreign policy. Beyond such understanding, we perhaps require a critical perspective which moves toward re-evaluating the values that are expressed in foreign policies through norms and ideas.
Finally, I claimed that a more critical perspective should be oriented toward making 'our' relation to the 'foreign' in some way 'better', more responsible, while acknowledging that it can never achieve an unproblematic, fully ethical mode of encounter. A values consensus in this sense is less useful than a politics of foreign policy as ethics. A respectful dissensus, disagreement, contestation and debate are where any hope for 'better' relations may lie.
Rather than a simple pluralism however, which as William Connolly (1995, xiv) says is often presented as an achievement which a pluralisation of approaches threatens, reading foreign policy as ethics seeks a ceaseless critical responsiveness to the foreign in the permanent absence of consensus. 2 I use the terms 'ethical' and 'moral' interchangeably, following Hutchings' (1996) argument that the distinction drawn between the two by scholars such as Jurgen Habermas (and, indeed, by Ward Thomas later in this article) is untenable.
3 Parenthetically, Fierke's criticisms of Campbell are misplaced to say the least. Firstly, Campbell far from implies that the 'game is over' by problematizing our reading of the Cold War and suggesting that, in fact, its dominant mode of identity construction has been perpetuated in US foreign policy (Campbell 1998b, 15) , a point that has been borne out by the so-called 'war on terror'. But secondly, one can only claim that Campbell does not suggest means for allowing marginalized voices to speak by ignoring the large parts of his work that specifically problematize dominant voices (see particularly Campbell 1998a, 115-208 ) and seek to provide them more space to speak (see Campbell 1998a, 209-243) .
